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Abstract
Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that
induce policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear
implications for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets. In
this paper we ﬁll this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that mod-
els social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability
of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors.
Then we test the model using a new and original data set that documents the
features of social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30
years.
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11 Introduction
During the last three decades governments of several advanced economies have re-
sorted to “social pacts” in order to implement policy changes and even radical re-
forms in the ﬁscal and labour market domains. According to descriptive analyses
(Regini, 1997; Visser, 2002), social pacts involve a political exchange, based on mu-
tual commitment among peak-level trade union federations and governments. For-
mally, social pacts are deﬁned as publicly announced policy contracts between the
government and the unions (and employers in some cases), that deﬁne policy issues
and targets, means to achieve them, and tasks and responsibilities of the signatories
(Avdagic et. al., 2010). Typically, pacts contain agreements over wage dynamics,
inﬂation, welfare reform, labour market regulation. In addition to continental Eu-
rope, where trade unions still play a non-negligible role, pacts have also been signed
in countries like Australia, South Korea and South Africa (Ahlquist, 2008; Baccaro
and Lim, 2007; Fraile 2010). It is also interesting to note that, despite a generalised
downward trend in the political inﬂuence of trade unions, at the beginning of the
21st century social pacts appear to be as frequent as they were in the ’70s (ﬁgure 1
below). More recently ILO (2009) has taken a formal stance in favour of social pacts
as a mean to promote employment in the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
The political sciences literature sees social pacts as the archetype of policy re-
form negotiated outside parliaments (Avdagic, 2010). A strong distinction is made
between ﬁrst- and second-generation pacts. The social pacts of the 1970s and early
1980s are reckoned as cooperation episodes between ideologically aﬃne labour unions
and left-wing governments, who traded wage moderation for higher welfare expen-
diture or lower inﬂation. The social pacts of the last twenty years are thought to
diﬀer from earlier ones in two important aspects. First, in several cases they have
been signed by right-wing governments. Second, they have established reductions
– rather than increases – in public expenditure and government action to protect
employment and labour rights (Regini, 1997; Visser, 2002). A number of authors
has associated social pacts with a high “problem load” such as inﬂation, unemploy-
ment, public sector debt and, more in particular, the Maastricht convergence criteria
for membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (Fajertag and Pochet, 2000;
Hanck´ e and Rhodes, 2005; Pochet et al, 2010); others highlight diﬀerences in labour
market and wage bargaining institutions (Hassel, 2006), or in electoral pressures,
political institutions and government strength (Baccaro and Lim, 2007; Hamann
and Kelly, 2008). Based on a rigourous comparative analysis, using a qualitative
methodology, Avdagic (2006) ﬁnds that social pacts in Europe in the 1990s have
always a combination of economic and political or institutional causes. Despite the
richness of the theoretical arguments, most studies in this ﬁeld are descriptive, based
on a limited set of case studies and use a qualitative methodology.
Economists have largely neglected the analysis of the relevant factors that induce
2policymakers and trade unions to sign social pacts, despite their clear implications
for economic policies and the functioning of labour markets.
In this paper we ﬁll this gap. We build a simple theoretical framework that
models social pacts as the outcome of a bargaining process, where the probability
of observing a pact is essentially determined by politico-economic factors. Then we
test the model using a new and original data set that documents the features of
social pacts implemented in advanced economies over the last 30 years.
Our approach brings together research ﬁelds and methods which are apparently
quite distinct, ranging from the analysis of unionised labour markets, to the political
economics literature, to the popularity and voting functions developed by political
scientists, that emphasise the importance of macroeconomic conditions to explain
policymakers’ approval rates. In a nutshell, our empirical results conﬁrm that pacts
are more likely when the cost of a conﬂict with the trade unions is relatively higher.
Such a cost depends on standard macroeconomic variables. It is also crucially af-
fected by measures of social conﬂict such as industrial disputes and socio-political
risk. In addition, it depends on the ability of trade-unions peak-level associations to
act as representatives of both unionised and non unionised workers. In fact pacts are
more likely when coverage of negotiated agreements is broader. By contrast, pacts
are relatively less likely when government expected tenure in oﬃce is longer, in line
with a standard result in bargaining games under imperfect information: players
willingness to stand conﬂict is positively related to their discount factor. Finally,
our results suggest that governments ability to resist unions’ requests - a key factor
in determining whether pacts are observed - crucially depends on voters’ attitudes
towards redistribution. In fact we ﬁnd the probability of observing a pact is neg-
atively linked to the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, a strong indicator of society’s
propensity to redistributive policies (Glaeser, 2005 Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 sets up the theo-
retical model; section 3 speciﬁes the social, economic and political variables; section
4 illustrate the data set and the methodology used in the empirical section; section
5 shows the empirical results; section 6 concludes. The appendix contains the tech-
nical proofs of the theoretical model and a detailed description of the sources of the
variables.
2 The model
In our view, the rationale behind social pacts is that the government sees beneﬁts
from “reforms” and exploits preventive agreement with trade unions to overcome
political diﬃculties in changing legislation. The resulting political exchange behind
social pacts implies that reform beneﬁts must therefore be shared with trade unions.
These considerations pave the way for our approach which is based on four key
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ingredients. First, social pacts are episodes occurring in the context of a poten-
tially continuous interaction between policymakers and trade unions.1 We model
this as a repeated bargaining game of asymmetric information. For our purposes,
it is suﬃcient to assume that trade union preferences are private information, so
that “weak unions” have an incentive to build a reputation for toughness. Second,
social pacts should not be dismissed as just another case of special interests politics
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001), where trade unions seek to sway political outcomes
to beneﬁt their members. In fact, pacts are highly publicised agreements, and their
features are openly scrutinised. In a sense, the (implicitly favourable) public-opinion
reaction and the ensuing political support are a key reward policymakers expect to
enjoy when a pact is signed. Such political consensus allows policymakers to induce
parliaments to back the agreements contemplated in the pacts. Third, securing
trade unions consensus requires that negotiated reforms bend towards their objec-
tives. This, in turn, limits the eﬃciency gains from reforms negotiated through
social pacts. Fourth, disagreement or open conﬂict with trade unions may involve a
political cost for governments. The higher such a cost is, the more likely the govern-
ment is to seek agreement with trade unions, and the more frequent social pacts will
be. In our model, governments are more vulnerable to conﬂict with trade unions
when macroeconomic and social fundamentals are adverse, the political system is
fragmented, the executive is unstable and/or short-lived.
1Employers associations, although in some cases signatories of social pacts, here are secondary
to the actual bargaining process modeled as a game between the government and the unions. See
Avdagic et al. (2010), ch.3.
4Consider a government and a union which bargain repeatedly over a surplus b in
each period t over a time horizon of T periods (T → ∞).2 We extend the interaction
to an inﬁnite horizon because we are considering two stable institutions where there
is always a positive probability that their relationship will continue the next period,
in spite of elections and leaders turn-over.
The game can be described as follows. In each period the government and the
trade union simultaneously make an oﬀer, wg and wu. Only if wg = wu a social pact
is observed. If wg < wu a “dispute” arises, where the union is able to inﬂict the
government a reputational cost (x > 0). The government has an outside option (y0)
that values the alternatives of either “doing nothing” or pushing reforms through
parliament. The outside option (y0) and the reputational cost (x) also deﬁne w∗ =
b−(y0−x) as the maximum transfer to the union in the event of agreement. Similarly,
the union outside option (w0) deﬁnes y∗ = b − w0, i.e. the maximum government
payoﬀ in case of agreement.3 Oﬀers wg and wu belong to the interval W = [w0,w∗]
Both players discount the future at a rate δi < 1 where i = g,u (government or











where σu) denotes the payoﬀ function of each player given the mixed strategies
σi.
Let us now deﬁne the Stackelberg action, i.e. the action that gives each player
the highest possible payoﬀ given that the opponent plays his best response. Thus
a Stackelberg action for the government would be “oﬀer w0” if the union plays as
best response “demand w0”, yielding a payoﬀ to the government of y∗ = b − w0.
The Stackelberg action for the union would be “demand w∗” provided that the
government plays as best response “oﬀer w∗”.4
In the model disagreement occurs whenever one of the two players plays a non-
best response against the Stackelberg action of the opponent. To obtain this, we
introduce a simple form of incomplete information. The union can be of two types:
a “normal” type, and a “tough” type which has as dominant strategy its Stackelberg
action.5 A way of rationalising this feature is to assume that there is uncertainty
about the true preferences of the union (i.e. “militant” vs “moderate” unions, as
described in Baccaro and Lim, 2007). Under asymmetric information the ”normal”
2We closely follow Calabuig and Olcina (2000).
3The outside option of each player determines his minmax payoﬀ, i.e. the worst payoﬀ that can
be obtained in any agreement.
4Note that the Stackelberg action of one player implies that the opponent is held at his outside
option (worst agreement). The model here has the same structure as the two-sided conﬂicting
interests game of Schmidt (1993)
5This is as the “commitment type” of Fudenberg and Levine (1989)
5union has an incentive to build a reputation for toughness by refusing all oﬀers
lower than w∗. The government, in turn, understands the normal union incentive
and, by oﬀering wg < w∗, exploits disputes as a screening device. Both reputation
building and screening are costly. In fact disagreement yields to each party a payoﬀ
which is lower than the worst payoﬀ in case of agreement. Such a cost necessarily
constrains the maximum number of disputes that can be observed in equilibrium
and determines the frequency of disputes (and conversely of agreements). The main
result is summarised in the following proposition.6
Proposition 1 Let GT(µ∗
u) be a perturbed repeated bargaining game, where µ∗
u de-
ﬁnes the probability that the union is tough. Let µ∗
u > 0 . Consider any Nash equilib-
rium (ˆ σg, ˆ σu) of the repeated game, and any history consistent with this equilibrium
where the union has always demanded w∗. Suppose that in t + 1 the government
oﬀers wg < w∗, then
a) the government must assign a probability of at least η that the union will not










b) there exists an upper bound N on the number of periods in which the govern-
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(1)
Proof: see the Appendix
The underlying intuition is as follows. Until time t the history of the game
has shown that the union has never accepted any wage oﬀer lower than w∗. This
obviously aﬀects the government’s prior µ∗
u. At time t+1 the government’s decision
to oﬀer wg < w∗ depends on the evaluation of expected payoﬀs. In each period
these amount to: the cost x if the union refuses and the dispute continues, y∗ if
the “normal” union capitulates, y0 if the government gives in. The reputational
cost x is paid until the union capitulates. Since then the government can play his
6We set y0 = 0, so that w∗ = b. It is important to stress that this assumptions is without loss
of generality. In fact, all is needed for the results to go through is an ordering of payoﬀs such that,
for each party, the Stackelberg payoﬀ is greater than the outside option which, in turn, is greater
than the outcome in case of disagreement.
7¿From now on we will omit subscripts on the discount factor since only the government’s one
matters. Therefore δ = δg.
6Stackelberg action gaining y∗. Such a gain should not occur too far in the future
since the expected payoﬀ from union’s capitulation cannot fall short of the present
value of the government’s minimum payoﬀ for the rest of the game (i.e. the outside
option which is gained if the government gives in in t + 1). η deﬁnes the threshold
probability of union capitulation in the future, such that the government expected
payoﬀ from playing wg < w∗ in t + 1 is positive.
As disputes continue, η is revised following a standard Bayesian updating process.
By deﬁnition η has an upper bound at 1, and this implicitly deﬁnes an upper bound
on the updating process and on the number of times (N) the government will oﬀer
wg < w∗. N deﬁnes the maximum number of future disputes the government is
prepared to bear. After that, the government will always concede w∗. For any
arbitrary horizon M of the game, the ratio N/M in (1) deﬁnes the frequency of
disputes.
The sign of the derivatives of the variables aﬀecting N in (1) can be explained
as follows.
• Consistently with standard bargaining models, dispute frequency increases in
the surplus b. This is because a larger surplus raises both the normal union
incentive to building a reputation for toughness, and the government incentive
to unveil the reputation game of the union .
• The higher screening cost x, the more likely the government is to concede w∗.
• Disputes are more frequent the more patient is the government (higher δ).
• The government is more likely to concede w∗ the higher his prior (µu) about
the probability of confronting a tough union.
3 Economic and socio-political determinants of
social pacts
In this section we show how the model can be tested by relating b, δ, x, µu to a set
of variables describing macroeconomic conditions, institutional and labour market
features, measures of socio-political instability.8
Macroeconomic conditions. If welfare losses are proportionally increasing in
the the distance between the current state of the economy and the ﬁrst-best, adverse
macroeconomic conditions should increase the expected beneﬁts from reforms, i.e.
raise b. As a result, the probability of observing a pact should be lower, because
incentives increase for both parties not to give in. This is in sharp contrast with the
8See the appendix for data description and sources.
7view that pacts are typically associated with “crises”.9 It should be noted, however,
that governments are likely to become more vulnerable to open conﬂict with trade
unions when the economic climate deteriorates.10 In other words, the screening cost
x is likely to increase in “bad” times. This latter eﬀect is akin to the beneﬁcial role
of crises for economic reform outlined in Drazen and Grilli (2003). The overall eﬀect
of macroeconomic conditions on the frequency of disputes is therefore ambiguous.
We measure macroeconomic conditions with the growth rate of Gdp, inﬂation and
unemployment.11
Labour market institutions. These aﬀect government screening costs (x) and
mimicking incentives for weak trade unions. Variable Govint measures government
intervention in the wage setting process.12 Greater government intervention in wage
bargaining between ﬁrms and trade unions suggests that the government holds more
political responsibility for unionised workers’ income and welfare. This, in turn,
means that disagreement with the unions is more costly to the government when the
Govint score is higher. Thus Govint should be positively related to the probability of
observing a Pact. Variable Conf Power13 measures the degree of centralisation of the
union confederation. A highly centralised union is a strong political actor capable
of generating higher political costs (x) for the government in case of dispute.
We include also more conventional measures such as union density and coverage.
In our setting measures of union militancy such as union density should be nega-
tively correlated with the likelihood of observing an agreement since a higher density
reﬂects popular support to the unions, which increases the incentive for the normal
type of union of mimicking the tough type. The government will then respond with
9Avdagic et al. (2010) criticise this “crisis” view as too simplistic. They stress that social pacts
are explained by the joint interplay of the state of the economy, and of the speciﬁc features of the
government and of the unions.
10Political scientists have shown that popularity and vote functions are crucially aﬀected by in-
ﬂation and unemployment outcomes (Feld and Kirchgassner, 2000; Fox and Phillips, 2003; Jordahl,
2006; Lewis-Beck, 2000; Veiga and Veiga, 2004).
11We also experimented with ﬁscal variables that did not add any explanatory power to the
model but caused a substantial loss of observations.
12Govint is taken from the ICTWSS data-set and takes values from 1 to 5 with higher values
reﬂecting higher government involvement.
13Conf Power is constructed by computing the ﬁrst principal component of several dimensions of
the relationship between trade union confederation (peak-level association) and trade-union aﬃli-
ates as described by the ICTWSS data-set. In particular it is the ﬁrst principal component of the
following variables: a) Cfrep: measures whether the confederation represents the aﬃliates politi-
cally, through lobbying or membership in tri- or bipartite bodies and councils; b) Cfappt: measures
the confederal (political) control over appointment of leaders of aﬃliates; c) Cfagr: measures con-
federal involvement in wage agreements negotiated by its aﬃliate unions; d) Cﬀund: measures the
existence of a confederal or joint strike fund from which member unions are reimbursed. All the
above mentioned variables take can take 3 values ranging from 0 to 2, higher values meaning higher
power of the confederation.
8more screening resulting in more disputes.14 Union coverage should have a similar
eﬀect to confederation power: the higher the coverage, the more costly it is for the
government failing to reach an agreement with the union.
Political institutions. Here we borrow from the literature that has explored
the impact of political institutions on macroeconomic outcomes. Longer government
tenure in oﬃce (yearsoﬃce) is associated with a higher probability of observing
a government change in the near future and is typically considered a measure of
government fragility (Carmignani, 2002). It is natural to link this variable to the
government discount factor δ: the shorter the expected duration in oﬃce, the less
patient and more prone to compromise the government is. Another measure of the
government discount factor is the dummy Election, taking value 1 in electoral years
and zero otherwise. We expect screening costs x to be higher in election years.
Political constraints that hinder the executive’s operational capability should also
raise the government cost of a dispute with trade unions. The variable measuring
such constraints (Polconstr) is obtained as the ﬁrst principal component of three
measures quantifying the number of veto players and hurdles in decision rules.15 A
higher Polconstr score should therefore positively aﬀect x. Finally, we consider the
dummy Left taking value 1 when left-wing governments are in oﬃce, zero otherwise.
We expect left-wing governments to be more sensitive to conﬂict with trade unions.
Macroeconomic and socio-political instability. A more volatile environ-
ment should reduce political consensus for the government and raise the cost of a
dispute. We use three measures of instability. The ﬁrst is the standard deviation
of Gdp growth over the previous 4 years (Econvol). The second is a measure of so-
ciopolitical risk (Sprisk) deﬁned as the principal component of several measures of
social instability.16 Finally, following a well known argument (see Rodrik, 1998) we
include a measure of trade openness to capture the risks implied in the globalisation
process. In fact several contributions see social pacts as a reaction to the growing
internationalisation of markets (Hassel, 2009). We see a strong counterargument
about the eﬀects of trade openness. In more open economies domestic ﬁrms are
subject to stronger external competition and unions are generally weaker and less
militant17 In our framework this implies that, ceteris paribus, the government prior
14In the model this could be conceptualised by assuming that a higher density reduces the prior
µ∗ that the government assigns to the union being of the though type.
15The variables are: a) Xconst (source Polity IV): a measure of regulation of executive recruit-
ment; b) Polconv (source Henisz), an index of political constraint; and c) Checks (source DPI):
number of veto players.
16More precisely Sprisk is the ﬁrst principal component of variables quantifying: a) Political
assassinations, b) General strikes, c) Guerrilla warfare, d) Purges, e) Revolutionary attempts,
f) Anti-government demostrations (source CNTS). When measures of strikes are added to the
regression, we recompute Sprisk excluding variable b) in the principal component.
17Baccaro (2008) shows that globalisation is associated to a weaker cross country correlation
between the degree of unionisation and redistributive actions such as wage compression
9about µ is lower and the the frequency of disputes, N
M, is correspondingly higher.
The prevailing eﬀect of openness will ultimately be an empirical issue.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
The data set contains information of the existence and the nature of social pacts
on a yearly basis for a set of 21 OECD countries (see table 6) from 1970 to 2005.
The source is the ICTWSS database, a newly created and original database which
covers four key elements of modern political economies in advanced societies: trade
unionism, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts. Economic variables
are taken from usual sources (World Bank OECD etc.), political and institutional
variables are taken from the most important and known data sources such as CNTS
archive, the Polity IV and the DPI dataset.18
The country composition of the sample allows a good variability of labour market
institutions (diﬀerent wage setting mechanisms, trade unionism etc.). The data set
contains a detailed description of social pacts. Our dependent variable is dichoto-
mous taking value 1 if a social pact is signed, zero otherwise.19
4.2 Methodology
The estimation method is a panel logit with robust standard errors. Time dummies
account for time eﬀects. All variables are lagged to avoid endogeneity problems. The
panel structure of the sample allows us in principle to fully control for unobserved
heterogeneity by running a ﬁxed-eﬀect model. However this model has well-known
shortcomings in the presence of a dummy dependent variable; in particular ﬁxed
eﬀect models would disregard all the information deriving from countries that did
not undertake any social pact, causing a sample selection bias that would distort
our ﬁndings. Moreover ﬁxed eﬀects ineﬃciently estimate the role of variables that
display low variability over time (such as polito-institutional variables). We therefore
opted for a random eﬀect logit model that allows to account for both the unobserved
heterogeneity and for time invariant variables, leaving the ﬁxed eﬀect model as a
robustness check (section 5.3).
18The Appendix provides a more precise description of the ICTWSS database, and of all the
relevant variables.
19Since we measure the decision to sign a social pact from its outcome (i.e. the actual signing)
we need to take into account the possibility that social pacts were not signed simply because there
was a previous pact still into force. We therefore excluded the observations when there was no
social pact signed because a previous one was in place.
105 Results
Given the relatively large number of regressors, to facilitate discussion we present
our estimates in stages (See table 1 for the ﬁrst set of results).
Macroeconomic fundamentals. For all the three variables (growth, inﬂation
and unemployment) the coeﬃcient is positive but only for inﬂation it is statistically
signiﬁcant. The strong signiﬁcance of inﬂation should not come as a surprise since
a large number of social pacts contemplate inﬂation control as the main macroe-
conomic objective. What is surprising is the absence of statistical signiﬁcance in
growth and unemployment. The ﬁndings on growth are conﬁrmed even when a
cyclical measure is used (deviations from HP ﬁltered trend), or when the growth
rate of Gdp per capita is used instead of the standard growth rate of Gdp. In the
next section we present some reﬁnements in our analysis that allow to better qualify
the estimated impact of an unemployment increase on the likelihood of observing a
pact.
Labour market institutions. In line with the predictions of the theoreti-
cal model, both greater government intervention in the wage setting process and
stronger confederation power increase the likelihood of signing a pact.
Political institutions. Both yrsoﬃce and polconstr are positive and signiﬁcant.
Thus pacts are more likely to be signed when the executive is relatively weak, either
due to structural factors (polconstr) or because government turnover becomes more
likely (yrsoﬃce). In apparent contrast with this latter result, the elections dummy
is not statistically signiﬁcant.20 As expected, pacts are more likely when left-wing
governments hold power.21
Macroeconomic and socio-political instability. Both economic and social
instability (econvol and sprisk) raise the chances of observing a pact. By contrast,
the coeﬃcient on openness is negative suggesting that pacts become less likely when
unions are subject to greater competition.
5.1 Social pacts and unemployment
The evidence provided so far suggest that high inﬂation is associated to a higher
probability of observing a pact, thus supporting the view that adverse macroeco-
nomic conditions increase governments’ vulnerability to open conﬂict with trade
unions. Then, how can a politically sensitive variable like unemployment not enter
in the determination of social pacts? A possible rationalisation of this result is that
20The result on elections is robust to diﬀerent lag speciﬁcations of the dummy: lag 0 (same year
as pact signature), lag -1 (year before signing the pact). We also constructed a variable capturing
government crises obtaining the same result.
21The statistical signiﬁcance of this variable is generally very weak, while it will become stronger
when time splits will be analysed (see below).
11for some reason governments are less willing to compromise with trade unions de-
spite a relatively high unemployment rate, i.e. there is some missing explanatory
variable in our regression. In our framework, social pacts involve a redistribution
of beneﬁts towards trade-unions targeted interests. Thus, it could be that, despite
high unemployment rates, governments are relatively less prone to seek agreements
with trade unions in societies where voters are relatively averse to redistribution.
Measures of ethnic fractionalisation can proxy for voters’ attitudes towards redistri-
bution. In fact there is compelling evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is inversely
related to redistribution (Glaeser, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). In addition,
since ethnic minorities are typically overrepresented in the pool of unemployed work-
ers (Lindley, 2005; Heath and Yi Cheung, 2007)), it could be that in our regression
the unemployment rate cannot capture the cost of disputes unless one controls for
ethnic heterogeneity. In table 2 we therefore introduce a measure of ethnic fraction-
alisation to capture the degree of heterogeneity present in the society. Not only is the
variable highly signiﬁcant, with the expected negative sign, but also the coeﬃcient of
unemployment becomes strongly signiﬁcant while the other results are unchanged.
As the table shows, the result is very robust to the use of diﬀerent measures of frac-
tionalisation.22 We experimented also with a measure of income inequality obtaining
similar results. We prefer the measure of fractionalisation because it better captures
preferences of the society for redistributive policies. Inequality, being a measure of
outcome, is less suited for this role.
5.2 Extensions
Table 3 presents some extensions to our baseline model; some additional variables
that are typically considered in the empirical literature on unionised labour markets.
Union coverage describes the eﬀect of trade-union negotiated wage contracts on the
salaries on workers who are not union members. The higher Union coverage, the
more inﬂuential trade unions are. This, in turn, implies that it becomes more costly
for the government to continue a dispute. Union density, a measure of militancy
and workers’ support for more aggressive unions’ behaviour (Ball, 1995; Bowdler
and Nunziata, 2007), has a twofold eﬀect. On the one hand it should increase
the mimicking incentive for the normal union and reduce the impact of ongoing
disputes on the updating of the government’s prior µu. On the other hand, by
observing an increase in militancy the government will anticipate a longer sequence
of disputes before the normal union eventually gives in. A similar trade-oﬀ should
22In table 2 we have used measures of fractionalisation derived respectively from Alesina et
al. (2003) [Etfrac1], Fearon (2003) [Etfrac2] and Easterly and Levine (1997)[Etfrac3]. These were
integrated by a measure of plurality groups (Plural) and of cultural diversity (Cultfrac) from Fearon
(2003). Note that Plural has to display the opposite sign with respect to the other measures of
fractionalization.
12emerge in relation to the variable General strike activity, which measures strikes
that are organised by peak-level trade-union associations and, as such, are inherently
political. In the previous paragraph we have introduced a measure of sociopolitical
risk (sprisk). Here we control for another measure of instability, the number of
industrial disputes normalised by the level of employment (Ind disputes), which
measures ﬁrm- or sector-speciﬁc conﬂicts that occur independently from peak-level
relations with the government.
We ﬁnd that Union coverage and Ind disputes are associated with a higher prob-
ability of observing a Pact, whereas both Union density and General strike activity
have the opposite eﬀect. We oﬀer the following interpretation for this result. Gov-
ernments are wary of risking conﬂict with trade unions when these seem capable
of intercepting the attitudes and interests of a relatively large number of workers,
i.e. when either institutional features of the labour market or shop-ﬂoor attitudes
induce the peak-level organisations to act as workers’ ”political representatives”.
By contrast, increased militancy23 and top-down initiatives such as general strikes
induce governments to ”call the bluﬀ”.
5.3 Accounting for individual heterogeneity
As stated in section 4 the estimation method chosen (panel logit random eﬀect)
strikes a balance between the need of properly accounting for individual heterogene-
ity, the need of including countries that do not display variations in the dependent
variable and the need of eﬃciently estimating institutional variables that show high
persistence over time.
The random eﬀect model does not fully account for individual unobserved hetero-
geneity; in this regard a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator would be more appropriate. However,
in our setting, a ﬁxed eﬀect model has two drawbacks. First, it disregards observa-
tions for those countries where we do not observe any social pact causing a potential
sample selection bias. Second, given that it exploits the within variation, it inef-
ﬁciently estimates variables that display little variability over time. Since we have
several variables that have such properties (generally institutional variables are very
persistent), the loss of eﬃciency could be severe.
As both a reﬁnement and a robustness check, in col. 1 of table 4 we run the ﬁxed-
eﬀect model on our baseline regression. As expected there is a decrease in the number
of observations and persistent variables (i.e. govint and econvol) are estimated
less precisely. Nevertheless all the main results are conﬁrmed. These results can
also be used to reinforce our ﬁndings on the role of ethnic fractionalisation. If this
variable were only a proxy for some unobserved ﬁxed eﬀect, unemployment should be
23In this respect we draw a distinction between militancy and ability to represent workers at
large (coverage).
13signiﬁcant also in the FE model. The fact that it is not suggests that fractionalisation
is the crucial element that interacts with unemployment.
5.4 Analysing time splits
The time frame covered by the sample is quite long and includes periods charac-
terised by diverse economic and social conditions. The seventies and the eighties were
characterised by the oil shocks, high inﬂation and rising unemployment, and were
followed by the important labour-market and welfare-state reforms implemented in
the nineties. We therefore split the sample using 1989 as the threshold date.24
The results are extremely interesting. Inﬂation appears to be a mayor deter-
minant only in the ﬁrst part of the sample consistently with the view that pacts
during the seventies and the eighties were mainly driven by concerns about price
stability. Also government intervention is strongly signiﬁcant only in the ﬁrst part
of the sample. The power of unions’ confederation over its aﬃliates and the role
of political constraints are signiﬁcant in both periods. Interestingly, political risk
(yrsoﬀc) appears to be a concern only in the second part of the sample. The role
of sociopolitical risk is conﬁrmed across sub-periods. By contrast other measures of
risk (econvol and openness) loose signiﬁcance in both sub-periods possibly due to
the eﬃciency loss associated with the sample split.
6 Conclusions
The conclusion of a social pact is headline news. Arguably, the Dutch “Wassenaar”
pact of 1982, the Irish pact of 1987 and the Italian pact of 1993 initiated a turnaround
in the economic fortunes and international standing of these countries. In the early
stage of the recent Greek deconﬁture the government tried, and failed, to rally the
unions behind its austerity plan. That failure proved costly. Faced with continued
and militant union opposition, the already low credibility of Greece’s government to
deliver on its promises received another blow and fuelled the surge in the costs of
reﬁnancing government debt. In other cases the costs, or rewards, of the failure or
success of a social pact are electoral and among the factors that may decide the fall
or survival of the government. These examples show that the stakes of social pacts
can be large. It is therefore important that we understand the determinants leading
to the conclusion of a social pact. Most studies in this ﬁeld are descriptive, based on
a limited set of case studies or use a qualitative methodology . This paper is the ﬁrst
24The choice of this date is due in part to historical reasons - the fall of the Berlin wall sets the
start of a new era for European countries - and in part to the need for having a signiﬁcant number
of observations in both periods. The results are however very robust to changes in the threshold
date.
14to apply a rigourous framework by developing a bargaining model and by testing
its implications using a unique database on labour market institutions, wage setting
and social pacts from 1970 to 2005 covering 21 advanced economies. We model
social pacts as a repeated bargaining game with asymmetric information in which
unions have an incentive to act or mimic as if they are tough and the government
is under some time pressure. In signing a pact the union oﬀers support for the
government’s policy, whereas the government concedes giving up some its inﬂuence
over the direction or implementation of the policy. What do we ﬁnd? Social pacts
are more likely when the stakes are high, in times of economic adversity and high
socio-political risk, when union coverage is high and the government is under time
pressure. Under such conditions the bargaining parties’ willingness to risk conﬂict
is lower. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of social pacts increases when
the central union federations have power over their aﬃliates and the state is more
interventionist in wage setting throughout the economy. We do not ﬁnd that the
probability of social pacts increases with a rise in union density and the occurrence
of general, politically motivated general strikes. In contrast, the observance of social
pacts is negatively related to the degree of ethic heterogeneity, which is taken as an
indicator of the electorate’s dislike for redistributive policies. This may indicate the
government’s unwillingness to make compromise oﬀers to the unions. In fact, the
degree to which unemployment increases the probability of a social pact crucially
depends on heterogeneity and the preference for redistributive policies. Considering
the years before and after 1989 separately, our ﬁndings are that only in the ﬁrst
period inﬂation was a strong determinant of social pacts, whereas in the second
period political risks, indicated by the probability of a government change, is much
more prominent. On the other hand the power of unions’ confederation over its
aﬃliates, the role of political constraints and sociopolitical risk maintain signiﬁcance
in both periods.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows closely Calabuig and Olcina (2000). With respect to their setting
our framework diﬀers because we assume that: a) the government payoﬀ in case of
disagreement (the reputational cost x) is negative instead of 0; b) the government
outside option is 0 instead of being positive.
Part A.
Consider a history ht of the game such that up to t the union has always played
its Stackelberg action ws
u. Deﬁne λτ = prob(sτ
u = ws
u | hτ−1) i.e. the probability that
in a given period τ ∈ {t + 1,t + 2,...,t + M} the strategy of the union is to play ws
u
15given the history of the game up to τ − 1.
Suppose that in t+1 the government chooses st+1
g , for instance oﬀering w0 instead
of w∗. The expected government payoﬀ from t + 1 onwards, V t+1
g (σg,σu), is given
by the sum of expressions (2) and (3) below. If the union plays ws
u in all next M
















































u) is the expected payoﬀ if the government con-






g deﬁnes the continuation payoﬀ at τ when the union plays
ws
u and the government plays a strategy other than στ
g.
If the union does not play ws
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g deﬁnes the continuation payoﬀ at t+i+1
when the union demands w0 after a history of ws
u until t + i.
The proof will show that st+1
g cannot be an equilibrium if λτ > 1 − η, where η
is deﬁned in Proposition 1, because the government would get less than its minmax
payoﬀ (outside option). The proof will use some upper bounds on the values of the
probabilities and payoﬀs in equation (2) and (3) in order to obtain a contradiction.





1−δ and V t+M+1
g ≤
b−w0
1−δ . Therefore expression 2 can be at most:
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i=t+1 λi ≤ 1 and
Qt+M
τ=t+1(λτ) ≤ 1 because λi ≤ 1. In addition, y0 = 0 is the
maximum payoﬀ that the government can obtain by playing στ
g = w∗, when the union plays ws
u.




≤ 1, expression 3,
is at most:
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which deﬁnes a maximum value for the overall payoﬀ of the government. Note
that proposition 1 deﬁnes η such that the r.h.s. of (5) equals to 0. Therefore we have
that V t+1
g (σg,σu) < 0 which is a contradiction since 0 is the government minmax
payoﬀ.
Part B
Consider the strategy where the normal union of mimicks the tough union by
playing ws
u. By part A above we know that if the government oﬀers wt < w∗, then
there is at least one period (τ1) among the next M periods, where the probability
that the union plays ws
u is smaller than (1 − η). Therefore λτ1 < (1 − η) = ¯ λ.
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) [Lemma 1] show that, if ws
u has always been played,
there is a ﬁxed ﬁnite bound on the number of periods in which the government
will believe that ws
u is unlikely to be played. More precisely the probability that the
union takes its commitment action cannot be smaller than ¯ λ in more than lnµ∗
u/ln ¯ λ





times. Substituting for η we get the formula in Proposition 1.
Dataset on social pacts
The dataset on social pacts was developed in the framework of the NEWGOV
project, ﬁnanced under the EU FP7 research framework, on “Distributive Politics,
Learning and Reform: National Social Pacts”, directed by Sabina Avdagic, Martin
Rhodes and Jelle Visser. The ICTWSS database contains information on the ne-
gotiation and signing of pacts, the actor combinations involved, whether these were
wage pacts or dealing with other issues, whether they were broad or single-issue
pacts, dealing with emergencies or deeply routed in standard operating procedures.
In addition the database covers the existence of bipartite and tripartite councils
or bodies for social economic policy making, advice and forecasting. All data are
17newly collected based on data from the project and from various national sources
and comparative studies.
The data on union or bargaining coverage are from various national and compar-
ative sources, including Traxler (1994), OECD (2004), EIRO (2002), Visser (2004),
survey data for the US, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Germany and the Nether-
lands, as well as historical estimates from Ochel, 2001.
Wage coordination variable has been constructed updating and elaborating data
from Kenworthy (2001) and Hassel (2006).
Government intervention variable includes the existence of a national minimum
wage; the way in which minimum wage decisions are taken, in particular the role of
tripartite bodies and social pacts; the existence of a provision for extending collective
agreements to non-organised employers, and provisions for wage indexation. Sources
on these issues are from the OECD, EIRO, the IMF, and research at AIAS on
minimum wage decision making.
The index for union centralisation follows the methodology proposed by Iversen
(1999) and combines data on the concentration or fragmentation of trade unions
with information on the division of authority in the union movement between con-
federations (or peak associations), aﬃliated unions, and local or workplace branches
(Visser, 1990; Windmuller, 1975).
The main source on union concentration are Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) for
Western Europe; EIRO (2003) and the database of the Institut des Sciences du
Travail of the Universit´ e Catholique du Louvain on “Partenaires sociaux en Europe”,
developed for the European Commission (http://www.trav.ucl.ac.be/recherche) for
Eastern Europe, and Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2006).
The data for the two ﬁve-point scales for confederal and union authority are
mainly from Visser (1990) for Western Europe and the national (unpublished) re-
ports for the DUES Handbook (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000) and from Golden,
Lange and Wallerstein (2006) for non-European OECD Countries. The data for
Central and Eastern Europe is from the UCL ﬁles and several national and compar-
ative sources.
Data on trade union membership and union density comes from Ebbinghaus and
Visser (2000), Visser, (1991, 1992, 1993 and 2006), combined with recent admin-
istrative data on union organisation and membership from the Dublin Foundation
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Carley, 2004) and from the
European Social Survey (waves of 2002 and 2004). Sources and methodologies are
described in Visser (2006).
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22Table 1: Determinants of social pacts: baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gdp growth 0.044 0.008 -0.004 0.070
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Inﬂation 0.110∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Unemp 0.004 0.006 0.045 0.057
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Conf Power 1.102∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.32) (0.34)
















No. of obs. 594 591 512 512
No. of countries 21 21 21 21
Note: dependent variable is a dummy for social pacts, all explanatory variables are lagged by 1
period. Estimation is panel random eﬀects, standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies are included but
not reported.
23Table 2: Determinants of social pacts: the role of ethnic fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gdp growth 0.070 0.091 0.111 0.122 0.104 0.098
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Inﬂation 0.174∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemp 0.057 0.205∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Conf Power 1.251∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
Govint 0.486∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Yrsoﬃce 0.160∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Polconstr 2.000∗∗∗ 2.561∗∗∗ 2.244∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗ 2.385∗∗∗ 2.724∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.58) (0.52) (0.60) (0.55) (0.63)
Election 0.124 0.038 0.077 0.059 0.070 0.074
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Left 0.009 0.004 0.008∗ 0.006 0.007 0.008∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Econvol 0.451∗ 0.388∗ 0.364 0.376 0.379 0.421∗
(0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
Open -4.407∗ -2.527∗ -1.963 -2.435∗ -1.828 -0.888
(2.32) (1.48) (1.51) (1.47) (1.50) (1.56)
Sprisk 0.381∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗











No. of obs. 512 512 512 512 512 512
No. of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: dependent variable is a dummy for social pacts, all explanatory variables are lagged by 1
period. Estimation is panel random eﬀects, standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies are included but
not reported.
24Table 3: Determinants of social pacts: additions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gdp growth 0.091 0.139 0.136 0.241∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
Inﬂation 0.179∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Unemp 0.205∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Conf Power 1.056∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31)
Govint 0.513∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗ 0.615∗∗
(0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25)
Yrsoﬃce 0.208∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.144∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Polconstr 2.561∗∗∗ 2.552∗∗∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 2.603∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.69) (0.71) (0.69)
Election 0.038 -0.052 -0.075 0.212
(0.39) (0.42) (0.43) (0.45)
Left 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Econvol 0.388∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.581∗∗ 0.504∗
(0.23) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
Open -2.527∗ -2.280 -1.263 -1.349
(1.48) (1.54) (1.66) (2.13)
Sprisk 0.477∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Etfrac1 -7.541∗∗∗ -6.864∗∗∗ -7.314∗∗∗ -7.911∗∗∗
(1.89) (2.06) (2.10) (2.59)
Ind. disputes 3.724∗∗∗ 3.985∗∗∗ 3.801∗∗∗
(1.38) (1.39) (1.47)
Gen. strike activity -7.482∗ -7.755∗ -6.680
(4.21) (4.42) (4.38)




No. of obs. 512 481 478 460
No. of countries 21 20 20 19
Note: dependent variable is a dummy for social pacts, all explanatory variables are lagged by 1
period. Estimation is panel random eﬀects, standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies are included but
not reported.
25Table 4: Determinants of social pacts: splitting time periods and ﬁxed eﬀects
FE 1970-1989 1990-2005
Gdp growth 0.055 0.164 0.240
(0.12) (0.15) (0.24)
Inﬂation 0.141∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.179
(0.07) (0.07) (0.16)
Unemp -0.029 0.167∗∗ 0.254∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
Conf Power 1.675∗∗∗ 0.503∗ 2.323∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.31) (0.79)
Govint 0.316 0.681∗∗ 0.109
(0.24) (0.28) (0.36)
Yrsoﬃce 0.155∗∗ -0.102 0.319∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.17) (0.10)
Polconstr 3.022∗ 3.393∗∗∗ 3.910∗∗
(1.75) (0.95) (1.78)
Election 0.305 0.161 -0.006
(0.41) (0.59) (0.61)
Left 0.011∗ 0.014∗ 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Econvol 0.438 0.380 0.888
(0.28) (0.30) (0.61)
Open -7.370 1.080 -6.608
(5.17) (2.55) (4.13)




No. of obs. 316 257 255
No. of countries 14 21 21
Note: dependent variable is a dummy for social pacts, all explanatory variables are lagged by 1
period. Estimation is panel random eﬀects, standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time dummies are included but
not reported.
26Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Growth 2.81 2.40 712
Inﬂation 6.45 5.44 692
Unemployment 6.48 4.06 756
Conf Power 0.00 1.26 738
Govint 2.63 1.27 738
Yrsoﬃce 3.60 2.76 629
Polconstr -0.04 1.29 756
Gov Left 35.67 39.00 739
Econvol 1.67 1.07 733
Open 0.31 0.16 756
Sprisk 0.00 1.44 756
Strike 0.03 0.10 756
Ind. Disputes 0.09 0.14 673
Union Density 41.72 19.52 733
Coverage 67.66 22.25 697
Etfrac 1 0.22 0.20 756
Etfrac2 0.24 0.19 756
Etfrac3 0.13 0.11 756
Plural 0.85 0.14 756
Cultfrac 0.19 0.14 756






Finland Netherlands United Kingdom
France New Zealand United States
27Economic and institutional variables
Variable Description Source
Inﬂation Annual inﬂation rate WDI
Growth Real GDP growth WDI
Econvol standard deviation of GDP
growth in the previous 4 years
Authors’ calculation
Unemployment unemployment rate OECD
Open import + export as percent-
age of GDP
WDI
Yrsoﬀc Duration in oﬃce of the gov-
ernment (years)
DPI
Ass Assassinations CNTS archive
Genstr General Strikes CNTS archive
Guerwar Guerrilla Warfare CNTS archive
Purg Purges CNTS archive
Riots Riots CNTS archive




Gov left Cabinet composition: centre
parties in percentage of to-
tal cabinet posts, weighted by
days
Comparative Political Data Set
Sprisk index of socio political risk,
ﬁrst principal component of:
Ass, Genstr, Guerwar, Purg,
Riots, Revol, Agdem
Authors’ calculation
Xconst Regulation of executive re-
cruitment
POLITY IV
Polcon Political constraint index Witold Henisz
Checks Number of veto players DPI
Polconstr index of political constraints,
ﬁrst principal component of:
polcon, xconst checks
Authors’ calculations
Etfrac1 Measure of ethnic fraction. Alesina et. al (2003),
Etfrac2 Measure of ethnic fraction. Fearon (2003)
Etfrac3 Measure of ethnic fraction. Easterly and Levine (1997)
Cultfrac Measure of cultural diversity Fearon (2003)
Plural Plurality groups (share of





Wcoord Coordination of wage bargaining
Govint government intervention in wage bargaining
Conf Frag Eﬀective Number of Confederations
Union den Union Density, net union membership as a proportion wage and
salary earners in employment
Conf conc Membership concentration at central or confederal level (Herﬁndahl
index)
Coverage Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, adjusted
Cfrep confederation represents the aﬃliates politically
Cfappt confederal (political) control over appointment of leaders of aﬃliates
Cfagr confederal involvement in wage agreements negotiated by its aﬃliate
unions
Cﬀund confederal or joint strike fund from which member unions are reim-
bursed
Conf Power First principal component of cfrep cfappt cfagr and cﬀund
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